Operation Sindoor marked a turning point in how the Indian Army approaches unmanned systems. In October 2025, the Director General of Infantry said that all 380 infantry battalions now have a dedicated drone platoon, known as Ashni, with around 25 soldiers each. Each platoon operates roughly ten types of drones, including four primarily used for surveillance and six for combat roles.

The expansion goes beyond the infantry. Western Command has said that similar drone platoons will be raised across artillery and armoured regiments, while the new Bhairav commando battalions will also be equipped with them. Army workshops are manufacturing drones in-house, adding to the range of systems entering service. At the same time, Akashteer has demonstrated the value of a shared air picture, while Mission Sudarshan Chakra sets out a goal of building a layered national air-defence shield by 2035.

The pace of adoption is clear. What remains less certain is how these systems will operate together as they spread across different units, formations and manufacturers.

The problem begins with how unmanned systems are typically delivered. Each platform comes with its own ground control station, data formats, video feeds and interface. This is manageable when a unit operates a single type of drone. It becomes much harder when a battalion has to coordinate ten different types, potentially built by different vendors or produced in different workshops.

In practice, that can leave a command post working across multiple screens and disconnected systems. A surveillance drone detects something, and its operator has to relay the information over radio. Someone else may then have to enter the coordinates into another system. A counter-drone radar may track a contact without that information being available to a neighbouring unit operating a different set of sensors.

Each platform may perform exactly as specified, yet the larger system can still fail to deliver a coherent picture. These gaps are easy to miss during procurement because individual systems are evaluated against their own requirements. They become much harder to ignore when operators need to coordinate under pressure.

As the number of platforms grows, this fragmentation creates three closely related problems. Information that has to pass through people before it reaches the next system takes longer to act on and creates more opportunities for error. Units can end up duplicating surveillance in one area while leaving another uncovered because they lack a shared view of where assets are deployed. And when a target moves between the coverage areas of different sensors, gaps in coordination can make it harder to maintain a continuous track.

None of these problems is necessarily decisive when a unit operates a handful of drones. Across thousands of systems distributed among infantry, artillery, armour and air defence, however, the cumulative effect can be significant. The issue is not simply how much information each platform collects, but whether that information reaches the right people and systems in time to be useful.

More platforms won't solve fragmentation

A mosaic illustration of an operator at a desk of screens and cables, an Indian flag behind

Buying more platforms will not resolve this on its own. In fact, adding another system to an already fragmented fleet can introduce yet another controller, data format and integration requirement. More hardware can expand a force's capabilities, but it can also make those capabilities harder to coordinate if the underlying architecture remains unchanged.

This is increasingly recognised across the defence industry. Israel Aerospace Industries has argued that platforms no longer win wars; architecture does. The broader point is that a platform's value depends not only on what it can do independently, but also on how effectively it connects with the rest of the force. A capable drone is useful in its own right. Its operational value increases when its data can inform decisions and actions across other systems.

The US Army is approaching a similar challenge through its Next Generation Command and Control programme. The effort aims to move beyond a command-and-control environment divided across separate systems for functions such as fires, logistics, intelligence and airspace management. A common data layer is intended to bring this information together into a shared operational picture, connecting decision-making from individual soldiers to corps headquarters.

For India, this distinction matters as much as the number of platforms being inducted. Counting drones, raising platoons and deploying additional sensors are useful measures of progress, but they do not tell the whole story. A larger inventory does not automatically translate into a more capable force.

The more important question is whether the systems already in service can exchange information and support coordinated action. Can a detection made by a surveillance drone reach an air-defence operator in seconds, in a format their system can use? Can a commander see the status and location of assets across infantry, artillery and armour without having to piece together information from several disconnected interfaces?

Building a common mission layer

Answering these questions requires a shift in how unmanned capabilities are integrated. This does not mean replacing existing drones, radars or vehicles, or asking manufacturers to build everything around a single proprietary system. It means introducing a common mission layer above the hardware, allowing platforms from different manufacturers to contribute to the same operational picture.

Such a layer would bring data from different systems into a shared environment, help operators coordinate assets and support mission planning across platforms. Instead of treating every drone as a separate tool with its own interface and workflow, the force could use them as part of a coordinated mission. Existing hardware would remain valuable, while its usefulness would no longer depend entirely on the system it arrived with.

The advantage is in how systems work together

Two principles are essential to making this work. The first is interoperability: the mission layer must be vendor-agnostic, so that integrating a new platform does not depend on adopting one manufacturer's entire ecosystem. The second is clear human authority. Better orchestration should reduce the time and effort required to get information to decision-makers, while keeping operational decisions and accountability with the people responsible for them.

India has made considerable progress in expanding its unmanned capabilities. As these systems become more widely distributed across the armed forces, the next challenge is ensuring that they function as parts of a connected force rather than as separate inventories of equipment.

The advantage will not come from owning the largest number of drones alone. It will come from being able to coordinate the systems already available, share information across them and turn that information into timely action under human command.

Driif builds Mission OS, a mission layer designed to connect unmanned systems from different manufacturers and help operators coordinate them as part of a single mission. Learn more about Mission OS.

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